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By STEVEN K. HAZEN
Partner,Paul,Hastings,Janofsky & Walker, Los Angeles.
B.A. 1970, Pepperdine University; JD. 1975, University of
Chicago.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The lawyer representing a client in an international transaction is
frequently called upon to provide more than strictly substantive legal advice. Although it is not unusual for a lawyer to be expected to perform
certain quasi-"deal" functions in domestic commercial transactions, it is
becoming the standard in international transactions.
That function often manifests itself in the lawyer being called upon
to provide advice on cultural expectations, procedures, and norms. In
China, it can be such a pervasive issue in negotiations that the lawyer
becomes an important participant in the strategic and tactical planning
which in other circumstances might be viewed solely as a management
function.
II.

BACKGROUND CONTEXT

Initially, it is important to recognize the impact of the growing sophistication of Chinese business practices and of the counterparts in
China with whom the foreign businessperson will be negotiating. In order to provide perspective, a brief digression summarizing situations frequently encountered during the period immediately after China began
opening up to commercial transactions with the outside world may prove
helpful.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, businesspersons from countries all
over the world initiated commercial efforts with nearly boundless enthusiasm and optimism. China was often characterized as a country of one
* Adapted from a speech presented at the Sixth Annual Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review Symposium on International Legal Practice held at University of
California, Hastings College of the Law on February 21, 1987.
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billion toothbrushes, two billion armpits, and so forth. Many observers
cautioned business clients not to allow the newness of the experience and
the exotic environment to color hard business decisions.
At that time, China was relatively new to the international market
and not fully prepared to deal with it. The lack of preparedness manifested itself in a number of typical obstacles encountered by the interested foreign party. Visas were hard to obtain in a timely fashion.
Counterpart negotiators were not always experienced in the subject matter of negotiations. The bureaucratic approval process was not uniform
and frequently evidenced its own uncertainty as to correct procedures.
Laws were adopted without implementing regulations and sometimes
were interpreted on an ad hoc basis. Finally, foreigners were fully expected to understand China's cultural and business practices without any
apparent awareness by their Chinese counterparts of the cultural and
business practices of their guests.
In recent years, it has become clear that the difficulties experienced
in China by foreign businesspersons has led the pendulum to swing to the
other side; the previous optimism has turned into a pervasive sense of
deep pessimism. The advice given today is the analog of the advice given
in the late 1970s. Doing business in China is time consuming, arduous,
and uncertain. Nonetheless, persons who are able to cut through the
emotion of undertaking such effort and focus carefully on the business
and economic decisions which must be made can find it rewarding.
III.
A.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

"The More Things Change..."

In some respects, the current situation is unchanged from the past.
Most obviously, China is still a Marxist-Leninist country with state planning playing a pervasive role in its economy. It is unfortunate that relaxations in certain central planning policies led some observers to describe
China in neo-capitalist terms. That was not true and no doubt misled
many businesspersons into adopting strategies which ultimately led to an
eye-opening disappointment. As a result, any governmental actions
which have appeared to increase central control have been viewed as a
step backwards and have led to disillusionment.
This observation has within it a very positive conclusion: Deng
Xiaoping still likes cats and favors those which catch mice. Mr. Deng
got into some trouble during the dying stages of the Cultural Revolution
by observing that it does not matter whether a cat is black or white as
long as it catches mice. His critics took this to be an indication that he
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was so pragmatic as not to care whether China were socialistic or capitalistic as long as it is modernized. In fact, Mr. Deng cares a great deal
about that issue but his pragmatism extends to the methods for attaining
what the Chinese call "socialist modernization." Catching mice is just
another way of saying "get the deal done," a sentiment which approaches
the status of holy writ in the commercial arena. Knowing that the other
side shares the goal oriented view of commercial transactions should reassure foreign business that opportunities do exist.
There has been massive development in the body of commercial
laws and regulations in China since 1978. Nonetheless, there continue to
be holes in the system, indicating that additional laws and regulations are
required. In fact, the Chinese Government does seem to be aware of
these needs. The point to be emphasized is that the commercial system
in which the foreign businesses must operate in China is still relatively
new and it is reasonable to expect adjustments on the basis of experience.
Businesses waiting for iron-clad certainty will enter the arena much too
late in the game.
B.

Management Pool

In many areas the management pool in China remains very thin.
Over the last several years, however, there have been major strides in this
area. It is a much more frequent occurrence today for foreign businesspersons to encounter technical experts across the table.
In part, this advancement has been the result of a more efficient
allocation of talented resources. Advances have also been realized simply
as a result of experience. Those who have had the opportunity to work
with the same entity over a period of time and a variety of transactions
may be more sanguine on the future developments in this area than
others have been. Finally, China has benefited significantly from the large
number of its students who have studied abroad over the past several
years and returned to China to take up positions involving international
commercial transactions. Advancements in this area probably will be
even more obvious when the students who have stayed abroad after study
to receive practical training and experience return to China.
C.

Negotiation Experience

China has a very long history of commercial negotiation and should
not be seen as having been a neophyte when it began opening to the
outside world. To be sure, there has been a pronounced restart period
resulting from the isolation of the 1950s and 1960s and the loss of a large
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pool of talent during the tumult of the "Hundred Flowers" backlash in
the 1950s, the Great Leap Forward in the early 1960s, and the Cultural
Revolution in the later 1960s and early 1970s.
More than a few foreign businesses, however, have fallen into a trap
by assuming that their Chinese counterparts are entirely unsophisticated.
In the negotiation context, few are shrewder or quicker to grasp new
ideas than some of the Chinese involved in negotiation with foreign
enterprises.
Unlike the early years, it is also more usual today to find Chinese
counterparts who have a much greater awareness of the foreign party's
own cultural expectations. Notwithstanding that development, it appears that we are still a long way from the time when negotiations and
documentation will be conducted solely in English.
D.

Negotiation Process

Significant changes have occurred in the negotiation process over
the past several years. One has been in the area of the complexity of legal
documentation. Several years ago, the rule of thumb in China was that
no document should be longer than four pages, regardless of the language it was in. Chinese is a much more compact language than English,
which should have been helpful, but it is also a much less precise language (at least with respect to the relationship between concepts and between subject and verb and with respect to such things as time frames).
This resulted in a need for greater rather than fewer descriptive provisions in documents. Consequently, the earlier documentation reflected
an uneasy accommodation between languages.
The Chinese have recognized this problem and are now receptive to,
and in some instances advocates of, greater specificity in contractual relations. In part, that has been the result of experiencing greater understanding in contractual relationships evidenced by more specific
agreements than those evidenced by statements of general principles.
This development seems limited to the international commercial relations and apparently has not had a similar effect on domestic commercial
practices in China. In part, the diversity between domestic and international practices must represent a recognition that there are limitations
inherent in long-distance relationships which require some adjustment of
the traditional Chinese expectations. Today, it is not unusual to arrive at
documentation approaching the prolixity characteristic of documentation typical of domestic transactions in the United States.
With this development has come a certain streamlining of the nego-
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tiation process. In the early years, it was not unusual for a foreign party
to have to go through at least three stages of documentation: an initial
letter of understanding, an interim agreement, and a final agreement.
Adding the need for feasibility studies between these stages, it is easy to
understand why the negotiation process was on occasion very lengthy.
This process probably will continue to be encountered in dealing
with Chinese entities newer to the arena of international transactions.
Nonetheless, the interim agreement is a vanishing species in transactions
involving repeat players on both the Chinese and foreign sides. This development should be heartening to foreign businesses interested in China,
but should not be taken for granted or misunderstood. The negotiation
process continues to be used by the Chinese as a process for reconciling
different positions and economic goals with their foreign guests. The process will continue to take just as much time as is necessary to achieve
that result and any effort to take shortcuts reasonably can be expected to
be counterproductive.
E. Bureaucratic Overlays
Anyone who forgets that China invented bureaucracy and has lived
with it for thousands of years will be in for a very abrupt awakening. To
be sure, China has taken steps which may have the appearance of streamlining bureaucratic overlays. However, it is risky for a foreign business
to assume that it fully understands the bureaucratic system and can find
the one key person who can make all of the decisions and bind the Chinese side to an agreement.
Prudent individuals involved in a particular project should make a
point of visiting with responsible officials at all levels of bureaucracy
(municipal or Special Economic Zone, provincial, and central). The "not
invented here" syndrome was invented by bureaucracy and is alive and
well in the world's oldest bureaucracy. The point to be made here, however, is that it is not necessary for the foreign party to know exactly
which level or, even more specifically, which official will be responsible
for making a decision. As a defensive maneuver, however, it is important
to take reasonable steps to be certain that a project is not derailed by
some nameless official at an equally unknown agency. Of course, the
further away the ultimate decision is made from the level at which substantive negotiations are conducted, the greater the differences in dynamics, experience, and a variety of other factors at the decision-making
level. Foreign parties, therefore, must tailor their strategies to a broader
audience than the one they address face-to-face.
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Role of the Attorney

The role of the attorney in transactions in China has changed in a
number of ways. In some early transactions, the role of a lawyer would
be more visible than in others, but in all situations it would be as an
advisor to someone else who was presented as the decision-maker. In
more recent years, the status of the lawyer has changed noticeably. It is
not unusual for lawyers to play a more central role in the negotiating
process. Some attorneys have adopted a policy of being the chief spokesperson and apparent decision-maker for the client, with notable success.
That approach may be used in situations where appropriate but it is certainly not mandatory.
One reason for the initial reluctance to deal with lawyers was the
fact that during the Cultural Revolution, lawyers (as intellectuals) were
labeled part of the "stinking ninth [or worst] category" of bourgeois
counterrevolutionaries. Due to the delays in improving that image, it
was unusual to encounter Chinese lawyers on the other side of a negotiating table during the early years. This situation is slowly changing.
Growing evidence exists that Chinese lawyers will begin to play an even
more important role in the process, particularly as the pool of lawyers
trained in international commercial matters increases.
This raises another important point. The day is rapidly approaching
when foreign lawyers representing clients in China will need the advice of
emerging local Chinese law firms with respect to the impact of Chinese
law on commercial endeavors. This will, however, probably require clarification by the Chinese side on the confidentiality of discussion with
such local law firms. Nonetheless, as the pool of legal talent increases in
China it will become increasingly important for foreign lawyers to take
reasonable and appropriate steps not to appear to be engaging in a form
of legal imperialism.
F.

Other Changes

Some other changes are more obvious. These include the increased
experience of China in the world banking system, the improved communication and transportation facilities which assist in the process of doing
business in China, and the willingness of the Chinese Government to
think about international commercial activities as a two-way street. The
Chinese Government now readily acknowledges that these areas still
need further improvement, and it is reasonable to expect that they will
undertake to achieve that as China continues its modernization and industrialization efforts.
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IV.

PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS

United States-China trade is an area in which lawyers must refine
their approach and temper their advice by reference to practical considerations. For example, it is important to recognize that much of the recent development in China's legal framework is a direct result of the
central government emphasizing its policy of fostering international
trade. For example, criticism has been leveled at a number of recent
arbitration decisions in China. Although the cases were decided in favor
of the foreign party, it was impossible to determine whether the arbitrator's decisions were the result of careful legal and factual analysis or were
arrived at simply because it is the policy of the Government to foster
international trade. Indeed, the entire legal climate in China is affected
by the fact that government policy has such an all-pervasive impact and,
in many ways, supplants our own view of the rule of law. At the present
time, that is a very favorable condition which results in foreign businesses having a better chance at arriving at mutually acceptable contractual arrangements. Nonetheless, that system is essentially alien to any of
our Western legal systems. This observation is, of course, only important
as it recognizes the possibility that policy in China could change. In view
of the political structure in China, anyone advising that the commercial
environment in China is approaching the Western model is simply waiting to step on a rake.
Another practical observation is that many foreign businesses have
made things more difficult for themselves by starting with an equity joint
venture. Business in China is conducted primarily on the basis of trust
established between parties. The equity joint venture method of commercial transactions places a great strain on that relationship. Consequently, a good argument can be made that joint ventures should be the
last step taken rather than the first.
Instead, foreign business should begin with a very simple and
straightforward import/export transaction which is designed by both
parties to be a preliminary stage for later commercial transactions. That
approach leads toward, and is good preparation for, the cooperative production form of transaction whereby manufacturing operations are established and the compensation received by each of the parties is an agreed
upon portion of the production. If that form of transaction works out,
the foreign business could then proceed to the contractual joint venture
format that does not include the establishment of a separate legal entity.
Even if that stage of the transaction does not occur with the party in
China with which the first transaction was consummated, the foreign
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business is benefited by having a track record for trustworthiness in commercial transactions in China.
In establishing this initial relationship, foreign businesspersons
should arrive in China with a form of agreement which sets forth the
kinds of terms they would like to have adopted. That form should also
be translated into Chinese. Realistically, that form will not actually be
signed but it will do two things. First, it will allow the foreign business to
set the direction for further negotiations. Second, it will give the Chinese
side a clear indication of the foreign party's concerns. Communications
remains the largest single obstacle to successful commercial transactions
in China and this is one very easy way to limit that effect. If the foreign
business does not start this way, it may expect that the Chinese side will
listen to negotiations and (on the basis of almost certainly imperfect understanding arrived at through interpreters) draw up their own form of
contract. That document will start with some misunderstandings built
into it, will establish the framework from which the Chinese proceed
thereafter, and in many cases may be fairly unsophisticated by international standards. From a practical point, once the first form of contract
has been produced for parties to examine it is very difficult to start all
over again and propose an entirely new form.
The next practical concern is the importance of obtaining a certificate from the Chinese Tax Bureau with respect to the impact of Chinese
taxation upon a proposed transaction. It is not unusual for local authorities to assert that all tax matters have been cleared with the appropriate
authorities and that the foreign investor will receive certain specified tax
advantages. In many cases, those assertions will be correct. In many
other cases, however, they are more a statement of hope by local entities
than a binding conclusion of law. If this action is not taken, the foreign
businessperson may run the risk of never having a contract approved and
never receiving a definitive explanation.
More ominous is the possibility that the contract will be approved
and the Tax Bureau later will take the position that it is not bound by tax
agreements contained in the contract. Indeed, some foreign businesses
have been required to make significant payments that were not included
in the original calculation of whether the transaction made good economic sense in the first place. Others have been faced with the prospect
of being advised by their Chinese counterpart that the Tax Bureau has
taken an adverse position and the contract may not be approved unless
the foreign counterpart agrees to make certain changes. By that time,
the foreign business may have so much money and energy invested in the
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project that the economic judgment on whether to enter into the contract
in the first place may not be made on the most objective basis.
Another practical issue is the role that international accounting
firms can play in the process of commercial transactions with China.
Traditionally, accounting firms and law firms often have poached on
each other's turf when dealing in international matters. In some instances, this has led lawyers to advise their clients to stay away from
accountants. The better position is that there simply needs to be an allocation of responsibility between law firms and accounting firms. Each
group of professionals then could perform those functions it is best able
to do. Experience indicates that the accounting firms that do their jobs
particularly well are also those that make clear allocations between accounting and legal responsibilities. Additionally, the Chinese have been
more willing to grant foreign accounting firms greater latitude in the
kinds of activities they conduct in China than they have for foreign law
firms. Thus, more accounting firms can be found there, engaged in a
greater variety of business activities than is the case with Western law
firms.
This also suggests a collateral but important matter: the formation
of a complete team of advisors for doing business in China. The one
critical player who has not yet been mentioned is the person who renders
advice on cross-cultural matters. From whichever source it comes (attorneys, accountants, in-house personnel, or others), it is important that the
foreign business receive advice in this area. Only a very few foreign businesspersons may reasonably be expected to obtain more than a rudimentary knowledge of the rich cultural history of China. Nonetheless,
anyone who demonstrates an eagerness to learn and expends effort in
doing so before arriving in China will have a significant advantage over
those who do not.
A related issue is the role of so-called "middlemen" in commercial
transactions. The overwhelming majority of foreign firms doing or hoping to do business in China have been approached by persons either in
the United States or Hong Kong who indicate that foreigners simply are
unable to do a deal in China without their services. To be sure, there are
a few "middlemen" who really can make a difference in a transaction.
Those, however, are clearly the exception rather than the rule. In order
for "middlemen" to justify their involvement it must be made clear that
they will provide assistance in getting the transaction completed and not
merely provide introductions to people and be compensated for assistance actually rendered. The concept of friendship in doing commercial
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transactions is important, but the appearance of people trying to buy that
friendship through someone else is not well received.
Although the role of the "middlemen" is completely unnecessary at
the level of a principal, it may be of use at the middle or lower levels for
providing insights and advice on cross-cultural matters. That advice
may merit compensation for professional services rendered but almost
never merits a percentage interest in the transaction.
More than a few foreign businesses have been tempted to negotiate a
contract in China without legal advice. China is an area where such a
strategy is very risky and has a very low success rate. The laws in China
are complex and are becoming more so. Within that framework, persons
not having extensive experience in China may be lulled into a false sense
of security in dealing with Chinese enterprises only to discover later on
that no real mutual understanding has been achieved. Lawyers in the
United States have frequently been asked to review documents that
United States corporations believe to be binding contracts but that are
actually only ambiguous statements of intent.
One final practical observation is that a number of jurisdictions have
been established in China which appear to have a special status but
which may or may not actually have it. Four Special Economic Zones
have been established and certain flexibilities have been given to the Zone
authorities in entering into economic arrangements. In addition, certain
coastal cities have been designated as "open," as "free ports," and as
"technical development zones." Every one of those locations will involve
substantially less bureaucracy than other locations, but the impact of
having special status is by no means clear.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE IN THE
CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Foreign businesses interested in China need to obtain a variety of
information before starting a program for approaching China. Chinese
negotiation practices are designed to reveal the failure of foreign visitors
to have identified the bottom-line economics of their proposals. Of equal
importance, those practices also reveal when the visitor does not have a
firmly established goal. Thus, the Chinese often redirect interested parties into a project more preferable to the Chinese hosts.
Second, foreign businesses have been too willing to do a bad project
in the hope of being treated as an "Old Friend" for a later project. While
friendship is clearly an important element of doing business in China, it
does carry with it responsibilities which must be shared equally. Experi-

1987]

Changing Practices in the PRC

ence indicates that the Chinese recognize this point and have greater respect for businesses truly interested in engaging in "mutually and equally
beneficial" projects than for businesses interested in buying friendship.
Unfortunately, enough of the latter have occurred to condition the
market in China so that it led to some misinformed expectations on the
part of the Chinese entities, particularly regarding pricing matters. This
makes it more difficult for others to do business in China. It is better to
try to overcome such obstacles, however, than to succumb to the temptation to get the first project done at any cost.
Third, one of the most important functions of a lawyer in China is to
educate clients regarding the process and the realistic expectations. A
novice visitor to China is more prone to "culture shock" or making cultural mistakes, either of which can put a client in the position of making
ill-informed decisions.
Fourth, clients should strive for continuity of personnel in repeat
visits. This increases the opportunities for developing real friendships
and also results in the delegation being well versed in prior discussions.
It is not unusual for the Chinese counterparts to keep a very detailed
record of previous discussions and note any variances from them.
Fifth, in recent years doing business in China has developed a certain cachet which makes it susceptible to being overly publicized. More
than a few American businesses have made public announcements about
efforts in China which they later wish they had not made. Among other
things, that can increase the pressure to complete a transaction even on
terms less favorable than originally contemplated. China itself is a society that values understatement and low-key approaches. Commercial efforts in China benefit from the same qualities.
Sixth, a foreign business will find it practically impossible to initiate
business contacts without first revealing the outlines of specific goals they
seek to achieve. Such communication, however, should be limited to the
description and parameters of the transaction itself and not underlying
(and actually internal) corporate concerns. Most importantly, issues of
timing not inherent in the project itself should be handled with sensitivity
and presented only as a pre-established tactic of negotiation itself.
Finally, foreign businesspersons should remember that China is still
a developing country. Obvious as that may seem, it has ramifications
that are easily and frequently overlooked. For one thing, it is important
not to arrive at generalized conclusions about China's commercial environment that color decisions made in a business context. In view of
China's current stage of development it is reasonable to expect a certain
amount of fluidity and adjustments as experience dictates change. As
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already noted, the legal structure in China relating to international commercial transactions is still relatively new and may be expected to develop further.
China is not now and probably never has been a country which can
be easily pigeonholed or for which snap judgments can be made. The
foreign business that can be patient in negotiating with China and
equally patient in its own analytical processes concerning China is the
only business that stands any chance of enjoying a profitable, long-term
relationship with China. Lawyers involved in this area of the law bear a
responsibility to advise clients accordingly.

